Why did the Titanic tour submarine implode?

Thank you JH. I was under the impression that all connections was thru the Logitech wireless controller. The blogs capitalized on that.
 
Thank you JH. I was under the impression that all connections was thru the Logitech wireless controller. The blogs capitalized on that.
I believe that all control was through the handset, but you still need a receiver, processors, video, power control relays, etc. I'm pretty sure the wireless wouldn't penetrate the end caps (Faraday Cage and all that), and definitely not a few feet of seawater.
 
I came across this interesting video, posting about general engineering and the promotion of engineering:

 
you are offensive

the word used was may
Nonsense.
The word "may" was used to refer to the order in which the "window" (portlight) failed.
Just because the "window" is missing in the photo, doesn't mean it failed.
What is your mother tongue may I ask?
 
Nonsense.
The word "may" was used to refer to the order in which the "window" (portlight) failed.
Just because the "window" is missing in the photo, doesn't mean it failed.
What is your mother tongue may I ask?

You continue to be offensive with your less than subtle rip on me. Not sure why, but if you don't stop; you'll probably be banned. This forum has a relatively low tolerance for this type of baloney.

The list of potential failures of this crate are so many that speculation is easy; even by a composite boat builder with no c.v.

~dirt/air in laminate as witnessed in the video
~dirt/air in glue bond on titanium rings as witnessed on video
~portlight rated for 1300M diving far deeper as reported by the whistleblower
~stress risors at what appear to be machined edges of laminate to fit titanium;not discussed, but also seen in the video

If the crappy laminate failed and the ship buckled; the window blows outward. If the window is the pof; it probably blows inward. This is also speculative.

But you continue with ad hominem, knowing full well from our prior interactions where I'm from.

I will tell you one thing; this forum is not the open playland Twitter has become. I recommend you stop using offensive remarks.
 
Maybe you don't understand how much work it is to build void free laminates.

Or the sick feeling one gets when they take a part out of the vac bag and it has a cost of $1500 and you decide it is only going to be usable as furniture because of one error in a section with not enough perforations that created voids. Or the sight of 300 air pockets in a laminated part that can be repaired one hole at a time and a cost of 4-8 hours time.

And for this reason, you are eager to discount me for the fact I am not an engineer.

But after watching the build video and building my own parts; I'd never have ridden on the sub to even 300 feet.
 
I came across this interesting video, posting about general engineering and the promotion of engineering:


Very basic considerations in this video. But there is nothing harder for an engineer than designing something out of the box. Certification Bodies cannot assess specific designs using Standards, and are bound to rely on data provided by the builder itself. Aviation history is paved by dead bodies due to faulty technologies that have been authorized on the market, even if the culture of security is pushed at a high level. The worst are perhaps these ill-military designs, which have been properly covered up by high ranks officers, responsible of the death of good soldiers, but never punished.

In the end, i hope that the technical reasons explaining the loss of this submarine will be known, but that will be only part of the story. Human responsabilities will be also be identified, and because this sub already reached several times the target depth , my guess is that several procedures will be recognized as faulty, in addition with design principle that will be recognized as dangerous.
 
... But there is nothing harder for an engineer than designing something out of the box. ...

Sorry, I take great exception to this statement.
There is no "box". The only box, is the one that exists in the mind of the person making such a statement, as they tend to be closed minded in their approach and/or limited in the education.
Since engineers are trained to think creatively and to analyse each and every step. With validation and verification, by whatever means.

The "box" is just stupid management speak, because they lack the vocabulary to explain 'things'....as they know little about engineering(s).
 
The meaning each one put in this expression is indeed a matter of culture.

My only intend was to put in perspective what's being told in the video you gave, in relation with certification. High definition pictures of aircraft assembly lines, together with the speech, has given to me the feeling : "Look what's going on in the perfect World of Aviation". To what I've reacted like :
"Don't look too close".

Also, the speech about certification made me unconfortable. It's no panacea... Top engineers do not work for certification Institute. Controls are limited to some plan reviews, and most of the time, inspectors just have not enough time/resources to go as deep as needed to achieve the control level they pretend. In the end, non-standard designs are discussed around a cup of tea. Control bodies ask questions to justify their fees, and builders propose a vast amount of answers, ensuring that one point of view among the other will satisfy the inspectors. But in the end, the truth will be elsewhere.

Not mentionning the ambiguous role of certain Associations, in charge of assessment in their field, but also promotting the development of the industry...

Big mistakes have been made on this submersible. We all agree. But this video do not ask the good question : Why so many mistakes ?
 
.... But this video do not ask the good question : Why so many mistakes ?

I didn't say it did....i merely posted the link an an interesting point of view.
Nothing more, nothing less.

...Also, the speech about certification made me unconfortable. It's no panacea... ..

Again, no one said it is.
But what it is, is an independent review of what is being proposed, against known measures of 'standard' and/or at least a means of establishing new ones based upon a large database of previous information/designs within said body, that a single designer does not have or access to.

... In the end, non-standard designs are discussed around a cup of tea. Control bodies ask questions to justify their fees...

You have a very very warp view (verging on uneducated) of what a Classification society does...and how engineers/designers interact with them.
One can only conclude this is not part of your daily work schedule, or, if it is, it is peppered with bad experience of such.
 
To avoid sounding argumentative, I replied yesterday privately to Alan, but I have a hard time calling poor work out of the box or novel engineering.

I'm reflecting on JEH post about shop class.

If a composite boat builder sees numerous problems with the build, the engineers on this project deserve less than failing grades.

In shop class, we learn about glue joint starvation. It is elementary. Squeeze the clamp too hard and the glue is forced from the seam. 8th or 9th grade middle school stuff; my teacher was Mr. Gordanier.

Now, from the earlier video of the ring attachments, we see the glue smeared on by hand and the rings set on what appear to be machined ends. Added to this is the leader saying we only get one shot to get it right.

It is possible, I am wrong, but I count about 5 errors in this event. Sure, easier to say now, as post mortem, but if I may..they are fairly obvious.

First, the environment is not perfectly clean. The glue could get a contaminent. Did the engineer decide contamination was okay or irrelevant? Or overlook?

Second, the application method can entrain air. Same query on the 'engineering'.

Third, there is nothing they do that I can see in the video that maintains glue margin. If the ring and carbon tube are mated conically; it may help, but that is unknown. Even still, it does not eliminate the join forcing glue from the seam.

Four, the notion of hardpoints in composites construction is well known. But in the video, no mention of stress risors at the ring margins. And, if some work was done, it is certainly in question. How can a heavy titanium ring not be significantly stronger than the same section it is applied atop? The sea is pushing very hard on all of it, but the titanium ring is far stronger than nearby carbon tube. This is known and why we stagger tabbing; very elementary stuff.

Five, the CEO says, we only have one take. This is perhaps the most critical engineering error of all because it goes to mindset. Since when would anyone be willing to not reject workmanship? If, for example, they see a lot of squeezeout in one location; they'd need to be willing to reject the work. Or, for this beast, some form of testing of the join. We only get one take means the engineer is unwilling to reject the work which means they are unwilling to reject the work all the way along!

So, this is a breakdown, from a non-engineer, of 5 problems we can see from a very short video in only one aspect of the build. Hopefully, noone will lose the forest for the 5 trees I present. The point is, very basic composites concepts were disregarded and this cannot be regarded as out of the box, but simple omission.
 
One can only conclude this is not part of your daily work schedule, or, if it is, it is peppered with bad experience of such.
.
My background comes from aerospace.
My daily activity is composite engineering, computational fluid dynamics and..... Boat inspector for a classification society.
So I choose option 2 with modification : fortunately, I had no bad experience, but i'm really found off other's mistakes analyses. I did not use/allow the use in the boat industry of fibers that were banned in the aeronautic, which use causes total loss of ships. I did not use/allow gluing of metallic parts on vinylester-glass lamination, which causes the refit of all the bottom structures of the whole units of a certain model. I did not use/allow holes+carbon lashing into beams of racing 120' trimarans, which just rip off like papier sheets with "follow the line to remove" holes.

Not to mention the frightening aerospace stories I will tell you only for Halloween, at midnight..

#edit# And for the next Halloween, I will tell you what is like to be charged by lawers into court, after the loss of a 45m carbon wing mast. Before that, I wish that a an official report will stop the generation of opportunist videos, of comments of non-documented sources, of sunday's moralists that are very very very quick at throwing the first stone.
Because the subermsible is loss with her crew, there are mistakes. No discussion, basic inference... but which ones ? Why these mistakes have been made ? As an engineer, I rely on evidences, proven facts. I cannot be satisfied with allegations of the angry crowd. I know very well composite materials and can list all their failure modes. But that won't tell the true story of this very sad affair.
 
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The trouble here on the forum, is when these stories run out of fuel; they often descend into polemics.

Until there is a report, which could take a year or more; there is not much left to discuss.
 
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